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The Rise and Fall (and Rise Again) of Vernacular
Happiness 1

Haiyan Lee
Departments of East Asian Languages and Cultures and Comparative Literature
Stanford University

Mandarins, Bohemians, and Plebeians
At the beginning of Carma Hinton’s classic documentary
(1984) about gender relations in Chinese society, a male voice
explains, over the image of a pair of ruddy-cheeked little boy and girl
munching on snacks and loitering along a low brick wall, that the
birth of a boy is “a big happiness” and that of a girl is “a small
happiness.” The next shot reveals the source of the voice: a jovial
middle-aged farmer sitting on a low stool in a courtyard. The word he
uses for “happiness” is xi 喜. The reason he gives for the distinction
between big and small is familiar: sons stay in the family to carry on
the family name (and often the family enterprise as well) and provide
old-age care; daughters marry out and owe little moral or economic
obligations to their natal families. The patrilineal character of the
kinship system was the structural determinant of women’s debased
status in traditional China.
1

I would like to thank Kathryn Pothier, Robert Pothier, Amitav Ghosh,
and Daniel Bell for being the first readers and commentators of this
paper, and Melissa Dale, Becky Hsu, Hsiao-yen Peng 彭小妍, and
Weijie Song 宋偉傑 for inviting me to present this paper at their
respective institutions. I’m especially grateful to Becky Hsu’s
“happiness” team for offering valuable feedback and sharing their
research findings with me at the Georgetown Workshop.

90 | JMLC

Consider another anecdote. In Su Qing’s 蘇青 (1996)
autobiographical novel Ten Years of Marriage 結婚十年 published in
the 1940s, a baby girl’s full month celebration party gives the female
narrator’s affluent marital family an occasion for conspicuous
displays. Her widowed mother, who resides in another town,
obligingly sends in lavish gifts. Among them are a set of vermillion
plates holding four objects representing, by dint of homonymic,
morphological, or metaphorical associations, longevity 長, fate 命,
wealth 富, and status 貴: noodles 長壽麵, sweets 洋糖, wheat gluten
烤麩, and longan 桂圓. The narrator informs us that these objects are
conventionally decorated with velvet flowers and images of fu 福, lu
祿, shou 壽, or gods of happiness (from having a large family),
prosperity (from high official ranks and ample remuneration), and
longevity. But with a girl as the recipient, the grandmother has
dispensed with fu and lu, leaving only two images of shou: “I thought:
probably mother had figured that since Cucu was a girl, happiness
and prosperity were beside the point, so she redoubled her prayers
for good health and a long life. It was an inglorious thing for her to
have given birth to a daughter; now the daughter was extending that
odium by giving birth to a granddaughter. I couldn’t help take pity
on mother and her life of unremitting misery” (Su 1996, 52-53).
I bring up these two anecdotes to illustrate two points. One, in
traditional China, the idea of happiness hinged primarily on siring
male heirs (fu) and secondarily on prosperity (lu) and good health
(shou). Happy affairs 喜事 were typically associated with the birth of
a (male) child, examination success, promotion, the milestones of
old age, and a good death. Second, because lu was foreclosed to all
women, happiness was deeply cleaved by a gender gap. Upwardly
mobile men were able to avail themselves of both the public and
private sources of happiness. Whether pursuing the more prestigious
civil service career route or engaging in trade and commerce, men
had access to economic independence and social recognition and
enjoyed the pleasures of friendship, travel, and leisure. The successful
among them were likely to have come from large prosperous families
and able, in their turns, to rear a good number of children while
being shielded from the exigencies of life besetting the indigent. The
bohemian among them were also fond of consorting with artistically
accomplished courtesans in the pleasure quarters with whom they
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were able to forge a kind of emotional bond not possible in the
domestic context when marriages were rarely contracted to fulfill a
romantic courtship (Lee 2014, 117-57).
For women, the situation was much starker. As the grandmother
in the second anecdote knew well, the ingredients of happiness for
women boiled down to longevity, if only so that they could in their
old age reap the reward for a lifetime’s toil and pain, from footbinding
and childbirth to the daily drudgery of domestic work. The only way
they could partake of the blessings of the gods of fu and lu was by
proxy through their menfolk. Needless to say, their happiness was
entirely confined to the private sphere. Except for a small number of
elite women who commanded a circle of devotees to their poetry or
painting (or more rarely martial valor), or renowned courtesans with
a steady, appreciative clientele, women could not count public
recognition or financial independence as their blessings. Few still
could taste the pleasures of travel or the dynamics of voluntary
associational life. Indeed, to see and to be seen by strangers—what
Hannah Arendt deems the essence of human flourishing—
irrevocably marred a woman’s reputation and moral worth. In sum,
whereas men enjoyed a degree of self-determination when it came to
happiness, women were to surrender to the dictates of “fate” far
more thoroughly.
The gender gap in the conception of happiness intersected the
gap between elites and commoners. For the latter, fu was more a
blessing than a pursuit and is more aptly translated as “good fortune”
or, as Richard Madsen suggests, “blessed happiness.” While
individuals might strive and pray for fu, its bestowal was left to
impersonal, external factors—fate, luck, deities, cosmic alignments,
mandarinal goodwill, and so on. Its opposite was huo 禍, misfortune,
or calamity. In the Chinese correlative thinking, fu and huo were
believed to be mutually constitutive and one never strayed too far
from the other: “Good fortune,” pronounces the Daoist classic
Daodejing 道德經, “is the lair of ill fortune.” This logic is perhaps best
illustrated by the parable of Saiweng 塞翁, a wise old man of the
northern frontier. When his horse ran away, he declined his
neighbors’ commiseration. When the wayward horse reappeared
with a companion, he demurred at the neighbors’ congratulations.
When his son broke a leg riding the new horse, he waved away their
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condolences and subsequently felt fortunate when his son was
exempted from the draft during a barbarian invasion. Saiweng’s
serenely philosophic attitude towards the braiding of fortune and
misfortune took the individual will and agency out of the picture in
the contemplation of the workings of fate. No doubt Saiweng was
assailed alternately by sorrow and joy with each successive incident,
but happiness, it seems, did not hinge on his feelings but rather on
his ability to reconcile himself with shi 勢, or the “propensity of
things”; in so doing, he takes leave of happiness per se and simply
goes with the flow (Jullien 1995; 2007).
A familiar sight during the Chinese New Year Festival is the
upside down calligraphic rendition of fu pasted on doors, windows,
and walls, punning on the homonymous dao 倒, upside down, and
dao 到, to arrive. It is surely the most visually succinct way of
capturing the folk conception of happiness. Significantly, when fu
came—courtesy of ancestors or gods—it brought blessings to the
household or kin group as a corporate entity; there was no room for
a separate peace. Career success, for example, became truly meaningful
only when one could “return to the hometown attired in brocades”
衣錦還鄉 and thereby bring glory to one’s ancestors and lineage
group 光宗耀祖. Siring male heirs, likewise, was the foremost filial
duty a son owed to parents and the patriline. This quasi-religious
popular cult of happiness, however, was viewed with a mixture of
condescension and disdain by the elites, especially those drawn to
Buddhism and Daoism and those with bohemian inclinations. For
them, fu-lu-shou were crude, philistine desires that stood in the way
of the cultivation of inner virtue, de 德, and the striving for more
transcendent goals, such as enlightenment, immortality, serving the
Way or Dao 道, and bestowing benevolence on the multitudes under
Heaven 天下. Confucianism might be known for its avowedly
worldly orientation, but a true Confucian gentleman did not set
personal happiness as the touchstone of all values. Instead, he lived
by the motto, “To worry ahead of the whole world and to rejoice
only after the whole world is happy” 先天下之憂而憂，後天下之樂
而樂.

The high-minded literati might seek le 樂 (joy) and qu 趣
(pleasure, pastime) in such elegant activities as composing poetry
and essay, painting, practicing calligraphy, playing a musical
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instrument, playing chess, banqueting, clubbing, and sightseeing.
The more solitary among these activities were believed to purify the
heart-mind, instill tranquility, and align oneself closer to the Way of
Heaven than did the crass pursuit of worldly goods. When necessary
the true gentlemen willingly forewent the desiderata of fu-lu-shou in
order to pursue these more spiritual and individualistic lequ. In
troubled times, especially, they might well retreat from civic or even
family life in order to preserve their inner peace and moral integrity.
Eremitism was thus a quietist expression of the elites’ reluctance to
bow to the sway of fate and luck and desire for agency in grasping
their destiny.
In traditional Chinese literature, the convention of wrapping
up a tale, long or short, simple or convoluted, with a “grand reunion”
(大團圓 or 破鏡重圓, a broken mirror restored, in the case of a
conjugal couple) of family members separated by turmoil, intrigue,
or accident predominated until the mid-18th century, when the high
Qing masterpiece Dream of the Red Chamber 紅樓夢 resolutely
broke with it. The obligatory happy ending betrayed an abiding faith
in the justness of the cosmic order and was very much of a piece with
the literary convention of rewarding industry and virtue with the
blessings of fu in the form of numerous descendants and generations
of successful examination candidates-turned-officials. Significantly,
the central motif of the entire repertoire of premodern literature
(including both fiction and drama) was not romantic love as in the
case of modern literature, but filial piety. To the extent to which
tales of filial heroism were spun or embellished by the educated for
popular consumption, the elite and the plebeian worldviews
converged. With the exception of the countercultural type, the elite
did not pit their visions of the good life radically against the folk
conception of happiness centered on family solidarity, prosperity,
and continuity. Instead, there was a good deal of overlap and traffic
between the two social strata in that both subscribed to an objective
set of criteria for evaluating the good life. Those who sought a more
subjectively meaningful existence found themselves at odds with
both the elite and the plebeian visions.
Shen Fu’s 沈復 memoir Six Records of a Floating Life2 浮生六記
2

Page references are from the Penguin edition (Shen 1983). I have also
consulted the Chinese edition compiled by Cai Genxiang (Shen Fu 沈
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can help us flesh out the tension between a dominant, objective
understanding of happiness and a countercultural, subjective
understanding. Composed at the turn of the 19th century, Six Records
(of which only four are extant) is a lyrical account of the author’s
loving marriage, his network of friends, his beloved leisure pursuits,
his travels, and his liaisons with courtesans. A well-educated scholar
who failed repeatedly at the civil service examinations, Shen Fu tried
to eke out a living working in government yamen 衙門 as a private
secretary. It was an unstable occupation with a meager pay and little
prestige. Shen frequently found himself unemployed and had to rely
on family and friends to tide him over. He also tried petty commerce
but did not have much talent or enthusiasm for it. He did manage,
intermittently, to earn small sums from painting and seal carving,
though not as much as his wife Chen Yun 陳蕓 was able to with her
needlework. While they never quite starved, life was precarious and
his wife died young from a protracted illness that they could ill afford
to treat properly.
The memoir has been a perennial favorite of generations of
readers drawn to its tender depictions of conjugal bliss, convivial
gatherings of friends, and the small pleasures of everyday life. For all
the hardships and miseries that he frankly laid bare, Shen Fu looked
back on his life with gratitude and contentment and apparently
wanted us to think that he had a good life. Particularly memorable
were passages recording the playful and ingenious ways in which he
and his wife made the most of their simple life: cultivating bonsai,
entertaining friends, going to temple fairs together with her in male
disguise, and so on. Children were mentioned as an afterthought and
poverty never stood in the way of their zestful enjoyment of a way of
life that was aloof from the goals of vernacular happiness.
Shen Fu was writing in the wake of the intellectual and literary
effervescence of the late Ming (16th and 17th centuries) known as the
“cult of qing 情 (sentiment)” (Lee 2007). Given impetus by Wang
Yangming’s 王陽明 philosophy of innate moral knowledge, liangzhi
良知, the movement sought to inject an element of the personal and
the subjective into the Confucian ritual order by extolling the
supreme power of sentiment and love. Despite the resurgence of
復 2008).
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Confucian orthodoxy after the Manchu conquest, the movement
reached its apogee in the 18th-century classic Dream of the Red
Chamber. In his low-keyed manner, Shen Fu was living out the legacy
of this sentimental turn, to the extent that he was able to marry the
woman he was actually in love with, thus winning institutional
concession, if not endorsement, of a subjective existence dedicated to
emotional intimacy and aesthetic and sensual pleasures. That he
should have begun his memoir with “the joys of the wedding
chamber” bespeaks the importance he attached to the life of the
heart in defiance of orthodox opprobrium of conjugal intimacy as
unfilial égoïsme à deux. His deep and enduring devotion to his wife
put considerable distance between the young couple and the
extended family. Acting contrary to the codes of filial piety, he stood
by his wife when his father ordered her expulsion; years later, he
failed to arrive home in time to bid farewell to his dying father. He
tells us that when he finally reached home, he beat his head on the
ground until it bled in grief and remorse: “Alas! My father had a hard
life, always working away from home, and giving birth to an unfilial
son like me who seldom gave him happiness and who failed to care
for him on his deathbed. How can I avoid punishment for my unfilial
crimes?” (92).
The remorse stemming from the recognition that their pursuit
of happiness had brought pain to their family was also shared by his
wife. On her deathbed, she gave the following summation of her life:
I have been happy as your wife these twenty-three
years. You have loved me and sympathized with me
in everything, and never rejected me despite my
faults. Having had for my husband an intimate
friend like you, I have no regrets over this life. I have
had warm cotton clothes, enough to eat, and a
pleasant home. I have strolled among streams and
rocks, at places like the Pavilion of the Waves and
the Villa of Serenity. In the midst of life, I have been
just like an immortal. But a true Immortal must go
through many incarnations before reaching
enlightenment. Who could I dare hope to become
an Immortal in only one lifetime? In our eagerness
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for immortality, we have only incurred the wrath of
the Creator, and brought on our troubles with our
passion. Because you have loved me too much, I have
had a short life! (87-88)
Although the conventional indices of fu/happiness had largely
eluded her—rank and riches, a large family with many offspring, and
good health—she deemed her life a happy one by more subjective
criteria: a loving and companionate husband, several opportunities
to travel and see “the world,” and a home that afforded her a measure
of autonomy and a space for her creativity. All this she deemed
worthy of the price of a foreshortened life. And yet, this intensely
subjective, bohemian definition of happiness seemed beclouded by
anxiety and foreboding—about the hubris to dare be like gods in
their carefree perfection and immortality. If society at large saw
happiness as something that came to one as fate saw fit, then the
couple’s pursuit of happiness may indeed have violated some cosmic
law for which they must pay a price—she with her life and he with
bereavement at middle-age. In her last will and testament, she told
Shen Fu to make amends with his family and find a good woman to
look after their two children. In so doing he might atone for their
offense by reintegrating himself into the ritual order of the family as
a filial son and dutiful father, thereby putting behind his bohemian
experiment as a uxorious husband and a lumpen-literatus.
Six Chapters appeals to the modern sensibility with its
uncommon affirmation of the personal and the subjective and is
readily appropriated by modern romantics for whom happiness is
inconceivable in any other terms. It is easy to lose sight of the fact
that the dominant understanding of happiness before the 20th
century made scant reference to either love or freedom. As Prasenjit
Duara (2014) has shown, traditional China was a horizontally
stratified society with the elite and plebeian classes inhabiting
separate albeit overlapping moral and spiritual worlds. For the
Confucian gentleman, the cultivation of virtue required an ascetic
lifestyle and dedication to the defense of the Way against the abuse
of temporal powers, even when it entailed terrible costs: loss of rank,
property, and life (and sometimes also the liquidation of one’s entire
clan). Still, “there is no thought of paradise or hell. Virtue is its own
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reward and the inner satisfaction of being in accord with Heaven’s
will” (130). In folk culture, by contrast, ideas and images of paradise
and hell abounded and were a critical component in the cult of
happiness. Duara points out that while the elites did not themselves
subscribe to such beliefs, at least not overtly, they were generally
tolerant of the commoners’ yearnings for human flourishing and
indeed were apt to take it upon themselves to facilitate such a desire,
enacting a Confucian activist ideal known as zaofu yu min 造福於民.
An early articulation can be found in the History of Han 漢書: “May
the king bestow xing upon all under Heaven.” An exegete explains:
“All matters of human flourishing are called xing/happiness” 福喜之
事，皆稱為幸 (Cihai 1999, 1908).
The best elaboration of this ideal comes from a retired official
named Huang Liuhong 黃六鴻 who published an instructional and
reference manual on local administration that drew on his double
stint as a district magistrate in the early Qing (1670s). Giving it the
title of A Complete Book Concerning Happiness and Benevolence 福惠
全書 (1984), Huang explains the appearance of “happiness” and
“benevolence” in a book dealing with matters of government and
administration:
“Happiness” is mentioned here in connection with
the magistrate’s intention of bringing happiness to
the people, while “benevolence” refers to the actions
he takes to bestow benevolence upon them. … The
ancient sage Mencius said, “All men have a mind
which cannot bear to see the sufferings of others.
The ancient kings had this commiserating mind, and
likewise, as a matter of course, they had a
commiserating government.” This is, in essence,
what this book is all about. (53)
Given the propensity in classical Chinese prose for parallelisms, the
alignment of happiness with intent 心 and benevolence with action
事 in the English translation seem overly rigid. The Mencius
quotation makes it clear that intent and action were both required to
bring happiness and benevolence to the people. Of interest to us is
the assumption that happiness was a governmental affair and
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dependent on the moral charisma, goodwill, and knowhow of
mandarins. Huang Liuhong (1974) took it for granted that it was in
the power of the monarch and his deputies to make happiness a
reality for their subject people-children 子民. In fact, they could not
help but strive to “make happiness” 造福 and “bestow benevolence”
施惠 because they could not bear 不忍 the unhappiness of the
common people (3).
Thus in the orthodox formulation, fu was a largess that the
ruling class, on the basis of their superior access to Heaven’s will 天
命 through learning and cultivation, helped deliver to those who, by
dint of their ignorance, could only pray for good fortune and were
indebted to both Heaven and their father-and-mother officials 父母
官 when happiness did come their way. In this manner the imperial
bureaucracy arrogated almost godly powers to itself, yet it still upheld
the fundamental belief in fu as pertaining to the cosmic, amenable to
human intervention but ultimately unknowable to mere mortals.
For this reason, imperial Confucianism largely tolerated the spread
of Buddhism and Daoism, permitting their practitioners the niche
of ministering to the popular desire for fu-lu-shou through temple
worship, divination, and ritual service, so long as they did not foment
sectarian cults or millenarian movements that challenged the ruling
class’s monopoly of access to the Way and interpretation of Heaven’s
will. Commoners might pray to a panoply of gods, spirits, and
ancestors, beseeching them for fertility 多子多孫, clement weather
風調雨順, good harvest 五穀豐登, safe journey 出入平安, long life 長
命百歲, wealth 招財進寶, social mobility 飛黃騰達 and so on, but
must steer clear of worshipping Heaven itself (Duara 2014, 164). In
other words, the cult of happiness must remain a vernacular,
depoliticized affair, and unhappiness and discontent must not
become the rallying point for insurrectional politics, though not all
rulers were able to prevent the latter from materializing.
Rebels and Revolutionaries (and the West)
All this would change in the 20th century. Radical May Fourth
intellectuals pushed the internal gender and class fissures of the
Confucian conception of the good life and good society to the
foreground in their agitations for a total social revolution. Liberty 自
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由 was consecrated as the fount of all goals and values. The path to

liberation began invariably with the repudiation of the institution of
arranged marriage as the epitome of unfreedom. As is well known,
the ideological arsenal of the May Fourth rebels was stocked with
ideas borrowed from the European Enlightenment, mostly via Japan.
In Europe prior to the age of Enlightenment, according to
Darrin McMahon (2006), happiness was also regarded as a matter of
good fortune. The Greek word eudaimonia literally yokes the good
(eu) to what the gods (daimon) bring. In English, “happiness” derives
from the Middle English and Old Norse word happ (chance, fortune)
and refers to what befalls us by happenstance. Indeed, in most IndoEuropean languages, the elements of luck and fate are preserved in
their respective terms for happiness, most notably bonheur in French,
felicitá in Spanish, and Glück in German (11). It is a creed shared
across the premodern world that only those who have the good gods
on their side and meet their ends peacefully can be deemed fortunate,
blessed, and happy. In other words, no one is truly happy until he or
she is dead: “It is the end—death—that [ensures] in its finality that
one’s good fortune, one’s blessedness, can no longer be taken away”
(6). Instead of a psychological or emotional state, “happiness, rather,
is a characterization of an entire life that can be reckoned only at
death” (7). As Shen Fu’s wife intuited, it marks human perfection,
the state of approaching divine transcendence, and a precious reward
for the humble and the virtuous. McMahon demonstrates that the
modern understanding of happiness as a right, an entitlement, even
a moral obligation is a legacy of the Enlightenment. It is only since
the 17th and 18th centuries that humanity has come to believe that
happiness is its due and that every man, woman, and child can, and
should, be happy. Chance and fortune are increasingly shunted to
the obscure corner of freak accidents, and pain and suffering are the
targets of humanitarian crusades.
Once the Enlightenment understanding of happiness as an
individual right and as a subjective experience was introduced to
China along with European literature, philosophy, social thought,
and political institutions, two problems cried out for redress: First,
the folk definition of happiness as fu was premised on a gender gap
that denied women access to economic independence and moral
autonomy. It pitted men’s happiness against that of women and, to a
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lesser extent, the older generation’s happiness against that of the
younger generation. Women and youth, in the lingo of the era, had
no renge, a composite of rights, dignity, and autonomy. The social
imaginary of happiness rarely took their point of view, and when it
did it merely lamented their mean fate or hard luck. Secondly, the
Confucian ideal of zaofu yu min and patronage of the cult of fu-lushou masked an iniquitous social order in which the elites had the
wherewithal to pursue both lofty goals and aesthetic pleasures while
the commoners had to resort to projecting their hope for a good life
onto gods and spirits and the next life.
The most unflinching indictment of the Confucian social order
issued from Lu Xun’s 魯迅 “Diary of a Madman,” 狂人日記 the
founding text of modern Chinese literature. Its hallucinating
protagonist discovers to his horror that the pages of the venerated
classics are filled with the word chiren 吃人 (eat people) in between
sanctimonious lines about benevolence and virtue. In “The New
Year’s Sacrifice” 祝福 (Zhufu, literally, prayers for blessings), a twicewidowed woman is cast out of her home by marital relatives who
covet her late husband’s paltry estate, and then out of her employer’s
house on account of her accursed fate. Shortly before her death on
the eve of the Chinese New Year as a destitute beggar, she tries to
seek solace in the possibility of meeting loved ones in the underworld
(Lee 2014, ch.1). The story ends on a pseudo-joyful note registering
the jubilant atmosphere of a small town basking in the gods’ blessings.
The message cannot be clearer: the townsfolk erect their happiness
directly on the dead body of a wretched woman. This message was
echoed and reinforced in countless May Fourth stories aiming at
exposing the injustice, duplicity, and hypocrisy of a social order that
preyed on the weak and helpless in the name of benevolence and
harmony.
A story that arguably rivals “The New Year’s Sacrifice” in
bleakness is Rou Shi’s 柔石 “A Slave Mother” 為奴隸的母親 (Lau,
Hsia, and Lee 1981), in which an impoverished and desperate
husband pawns out his wife to a wealthy gentry family on a threeyear contract as a concubine. The temporary husband/employer is an
elderly gentleman who yearns for a son but whose barren wife is
unwilling to put up with secondary wives. Leaving her own infant
son behind, the “slave mother” in due course gives birth to a baby boy
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on whom she pours all her pent-up maternal affections, only to be
torn away again when the contract period is up. When she reaches
home physically exhausted and emotionally depleted, the husband
greets her with two bloodless words: “Make dinner” (219). Once
again, the quest for fu on the part of the gentry family comes at the
direct expense of the downtrodden, cannibalizing an underclass
woman’s womb, milk, and maternal love. Happiness seems sheer
extravagance for this penurious couple and for countless others like
them with little hope of rising above subsistence living and women’s
subjection, a condition likened to “the long night, silent and cold as
death, [that] seemed to drag on endlessly” (219).
It was this long, funereal night that the revolution of the 20th
century aimed to upend. The revolution was to take place on two
fronts. On the one hand was the liberation of women from the
patriarchal institutions of arranged marriage and virilocal residence.
In their place was the new ideal of the conjugal family founded on
free love, companionship, and women’s right to work and right to
divorce. On the other hand was the liberation of the laboring masses
from the yoke of class oppression and ideological subjugation enabled
by religious illusions or “superstitions.” The Chinese Enlightenment,
as the May Fourth/New Culture movement is often characterized,
was first and foremost an iconoclastic assault on the “old family
system” 舊家庭 and “feudal superstitions” 封建迷信. The heroine of
this twin revolution was the New Woman 新女性 who, having
received an enlightened education, dared to enter into romantic
relationships in the absence of parental supervision or in the teeth of
parental objection. Should the courtship or marriage prove unviable,
she was at liberty to seek annulment or divorce. The ideal abode of
the conjugal family was in urban centers where the couple could earn
their livelihood in the new commercial economy.
With the familial umbilical cord cut off, it was often necessary
for the wife also to seek gainful employment. In the process emerged
many a woman writer, educator, actor, artist, nurse, athlete, secretary,
and shop clerk, who proudly distanced themselves from the maid,
midwife, herbalist, and prostitute. An autonomous renge grounded
in economic independence gradually became a hypergood for
women, even when it led to insecurity, deracination, and loneliness.
In their bittersweet choice, we hear echoes of Shen Fu and his wife’s
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courageous flight from the pervading cult of happiness, ardent
adventure in the countercultural cult of qing, and soulful gesture to
repair the emotional collateral damage. Unlike Shen Fu, few May
Fourth rebels were willing to return to the embrace of the patriarchal
family, though some did try to make symbolic compromises with the
kinship ritual order. In Lu Xun’s story “In the Wineshop”在酒樓上,
for example, a young man, who in his radical youth dared to yank off
the beards of the tutelary gods in the local temple, yields to his
mother’s wish to rescue his little brother’s grave from an encroaching
river. Taking a replacement coffin to the burial ground with four
workmen, he feels oddly elated about the prospect of “seeing” his
long departed brother: “this was a new sensation for me” (1977,
148). After much digging, however, they come up empty-handed,
the grave apparently having already been washed away. Nonetheless,
he goes through the motion of reburial by depositing a handful of
dirt from the original gravesite in the new coffin. For this gesture of
honoring the kinship ritual order, he reproaches himself for betraying
his youthful ideals and yet is glad to have brought some consolations,
even happiness, to the less fortunate and less enlightened such as his
illiterate mother.
The May Fourth inaugurated a melancholy genre of romantic
fiction in which the heroes and heroines ruminated on the promise
of happiness in free love and companionate marriage and the wide
arena of free sociability and professional development. They rarely
spoke of fu, xi, le, qu and preferred instead xingfu 幸福, coined by
Meiji-era Japanese translators of European texts to render the
distinctly Enlightenment notion of “happiness.” Xingfu was part and
parcel of the modern vocabulary that, along with minzhu 民主, kexue
科學, shehui 社會, geren 個人, and renge 人格, heralded a whole new
way of being Chinese. With the overthrown of Confucian cosmology,
life’s meaning and purpose was dislodged from such external sources
as Heaven and patrilineal continuity, and internalized as pertaining
to a psychologized “human nature” or the “heart.” Xingfu was now
eminently an affair of the heart, a subjective state knowable only to
the individual, which the ancient Greeks called hedone. The transition
from the quasi-religious cult of fu/eudaimonia to the secular pursuit
of xingfu/hedone underlined the growing importance of subjective
feeling and the exaltation of romantic passion in early 20th-century
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urban culture. The new salience of emotion thus indexed the rise of
the individual. The contemplative fiction of Lu Xun and his
contemporaries chronicled this inward journey in which the
individual confronted his or her heart with little more than a few
foreign novels and treatises as guides.
The transition was much less obvious in the rural areas, where
fu and xi remained the keywords of the cult of happiness well into
the reform era. When anthropologist Sulamith Potter undertook
field research in a Chinese village in the early 1980s, she walked into
a world where happiness apparently had little to do with feeling or
mood and everything to do with proper conduct and hard striving
for prosperity. The cultural shock forced her to turn her gaze back on
her own society and cultural habitus. Her reflections on the centrality
of emotion in the West and the extent to which the social order is
validated at the level of individual feeling can help us appreciate the
dramatic transformation in early 20th–century urban China. In some
ways, the May Fourth and post-May Fourth urban generations were
already coping with some of the angst and predicament that would
manifest with greater urgency in late 20th-century Western societies.
Their experience of alienation from the rural world from which
many of them hailed also mirrored the cultural gap that Potter
observed in her fieldwork.
As Potter explains, emotion in modern Western societies is the
legitimizing basis of all social relationships, including not only
contractual ones such as marriage but also ascriptive parent-child
relations. It is an article of modern faith that marriage should be
grounded in love as its culmination and institutional sanctification,
and that it should be dissolved once love is no longer, otherwise it
amounts to legalized prostitution. Between parents and children,
too, love takes precedence over duty and obligation, so that
generational estrangement or abuse-induced enmity is often enough
to undermine the claims of blood ties. Moreover, within the domestic
sphere, intimate gestures of affection are considered essential in
sustaining and legitimizing familial relationships. Kisses, hugs, cards,
gifts, and constant protestations of love create the illusion that it is
affect, not blood or contract, that holds the family unit together and
fortifies it into an emotional refuge from the cruel, cold world
beyond. These gestures also serve to democratize entrenched

104 | JMLC

hierarchical relations by closing age, generation, and gender gaps,
thereby transforming the family from a social and economic
institution to a sentimental community. Lastly, the centrality of
emotion extends even to the workplace, the canonical space of social
contract and disinterestedness. Potter cites Arlie Hochschild’s classic
work, The Managed Heart, about the aviation industry’s effort to
train its employees to work the subtle arts of affect in order to provide
an experience of sincere, personalized service to passengers (at least
in the pre-deregulation era).
By contrast, Chinese village life in its most traditional state was
a ritualistic order in which emotion was not granted any formal
social role and therefore had no formal social consequences. In other
words, emotional experiences, however intense or devastating, could
not create, maintain, injure, or destroy social relationships (Potter
1988, 185-86). Emotional outbursts might be unpleasant or
unwelcome, but they were rarely consequential, nor were they
accorded truth status. For this reason emotion was often allowed a
wide latitude. Childhood tantrums, for example, were routinely
ignored instead of raising alarm or being met with solicitous efforts
at mollification (187-88). Adults too were permitted to vent their
anger or grief openly until the fit of passion ran its course. Instead,
“attention [was] directed away from the psychological processes of
individuals, especially their feelings, and toward the appropriate
expression of shared intersubjective agreement about moral values
and the social world” (190-91). The exception that proves the rule
was the amorous feeling of love. Because of its implications for
marriage and family, love was permissible only when it was expressed
in a ritualistic, non-individual-directed manner. A young man
wishing to woo a young woman would do well to put in a day’s hard
work hoeing her family plot, fetching water for their kitchen tank,
and then some.3 Happiness, it follows, was not indexed to the
3

There are intriguing parallels between such rustic practices and 19thcentury English courtship rituals as portrayed with consummate flair in
Jane Austen’s novels of manners (see Illouz 2012, ch. 2; MacIntyre 1984,
chs. 14, 16). In both, a man’s erotic interest in a woman is conveyed in
codified conduct under the watchful eye of an entire community which
takes it upon itself to judge his suitability on the basis of his social station,
character (embodied enactment of communal moral standards), as well as
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individual or the heart, but to the corporate kinship group whose
solidarity was sanctified in the cult of fu-lu-shou.
What this meant was that the social order, at least in the context
of village life relatively untouched by modern print culture, was not
predicated on individual consent or perceived to be an amalgamation
of individual will, as the theory of social contract might have it. Each
person was under no obligation to align his or her internal feeling
state with external exigencies. Citing Richard Solomon, Potter
contextualizes the non-alignment of social action and inner feeling
underlying “the Chinese definition of sincerity [which did] not exist
in reference to inner feeling, but require[d] only the enactment of
civility” (194). Small wonder that, in response to her frequent
inquiries about feelings, an informant interjected with a note of
vexation, “How I feel doesn’t matter.”
That the traditional social order did not take account of
individual feelings was precisely what was unacceptable to the May
Fourth generation. For them, how the widow in “The New Year’s
Sacrifice” and the nameless wife in “A Slave Mother” felt mattered
decisively if not absolutely when it came to judging the legitimacy of
a social order. This requirement also lies at the heart of the social
contract theory that undergirds liberal democracy. Jean-Jacques
Rousseau proposed the social contract to reconcile concentrated
power to the ideal of individual sovereignty and authenticity. For
him, a social order is legitimate insofar as it is premised on the
affirmation and validation from each member of the governed. In a
large polity in which direct democracy is not possible, citizens express
their consent to the political arrangement in which the majority
are governed by a minority by formally selecting representatives
who vow to represent their interests and preferences. In so doing
they symbolically close the gap between subjective selves and the
objective social order. When they pull the levers in the voting booth,
it is as if each of them were teleporting a little piece of their hearts to
earning powers. Marriage is thus not about matching two unique
personalities on the basis of emotional “chemistry,” but a part of continual
strategic negotiations of wealth, honor, and status among more or less
socially compatible kin groups. The economy of recognition and
autonomy and its attendant agony that characterize modern romantic
relationships are largely absent here.
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the political center to be melded into the General Will. The centrality
of emotion in Western culture is thus intimately bound up with the
primacy of the individual in the liberal political tradition, in contrast
to the marginalization of the individual and his or her emotion in
the Chinese tradition, as Potter has documented.
How Happiness Became an Emotion
To the extent to which modernity was a heroic project to
release the individual from an impersonal social order, it has always
sanctified sentimental emancipation as a revolutionary project.
Beginning with Rousseau for whom sincerity and truth were
synonymous, radical politics in the liberal West invariably took
individual conscience as its touchstone and the heart as its compass:
“There is a pervasive stress on what each and every individual feels
and experiences as providing the ultimate standards of legitimacy,
action, and definition of collective goals” (Seligman et al. 2008, 133).
It should come as no surprise that the “pursuit of happiness,”
enshrined in the founding manifesto of the United States of America
as a God-given right, should have also been conceived largely within
the parameters of individual emotion and subjective well-being, as
hedone that can be measured on a hedonometer, so to speak. However
difficult it is to conclusively answer the question “Am I happy?”—no
less so than “Am I saved?” or “Am I in love?”—Americans have
tirelessly sought out metrics and tests to gauge their affective states
and are forever hungry for newfangled recipes of happiness. It seems
un-American not to engage in what a British observer characterizes
as “the exhausting daily application of the Declaration of
Independence” (Whippman 2012). Periodically happiness gurus
remind everyone that happiness is an interactive, communal, even
spiritual enterprise: “Happiness comes from between: between
yourself and others, between yourself and your work, and between
yourself and something larger than yourself” (Haidt 2006). But in
the final analysis, such advice still takes the individual “you” as the
fundamental unit of accounting when evaluating the legitimacy and
efficacy of institutions and practices.
The authors of the sociological classic Habits of the Heart long
ago descried this deep-seated proclivity to take the individual as the
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measure of all things and “to think of commitments—from marriage
and work to political and religious involvement—as enhancements
of the sense of individual well-being rather than as moral imperatives”
(Bellah et al. 1986, 47). In sum, the American discourse of happiness
rarely strays far from debating the relative merits of what the same
authors call “utilitarian individualism” versus “expressive
individualism,” or of work and family, money and meaning, head
and heart. Out of this seesaw has emerged a distinctive American
breed of individualists: the bobos who strive to have both in equal
measure (bourgeois bohemians) (Brooks 2000).
For Charles Taylor (1989), the rise of the individual goes hand
in hand with the bourgeois affirmation of ordinary life, whereby
previously venerated higher pursuits such as religious contemplation
and military exploits are held in suspicion, and previously disparaged
activities revolving around domestic and occupational life are
sanctified as intrinsically worthy and ennobling. As the individual
becomes disembedded from the larger social structures and the
overarching values and goals institutionalized therein, personal
happiness is enshrined as the constitutive good, as the telos of secular
life and governmentality. The road to what Deirdre McCloskey
(2012) dubs “happyism” is a short one. Happyism elevates
hedonomics to a science to be deployed by psychologists and
behavioral economists who are all too eager to peer into our interior
hedonometers to count the frequency of dopamine surges. Much of
this new science is based on self-reporting and laboratory experiments
with isolated individuals urged to look within, hence reinforcing the
habits of heart cemented in what Christopher Lasch (1978) has
branded as the “culture of narcissism.”
Having experienced a social world in which personal feeling
holds little importance, Potter (1988) is critical of the great
expenditure of resources for the sake of continuous and pervasive
attention to individual psychological processes and affective states in
her own society (183-84). Eva Illouz (2007) too speaks of “an
emotional ontology” that is the hypostatizing effect of the compulsive
inward gaze and endless verbalization in television talk shows and
autobiographical narratives, as if the emotions are both trapped in
the “deep self of their bearer” (33) and detachable from the self for
public clarification and management (36). In place of a politically
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active civil society is a therapeutic culture that gives us “micro public
spheres, that is, domains of action submitted to a public gaze,
regulated by procedures of speech, and by values of equality and
fairness” (Illouz 2007, 37). Jackson Lears (2013) invokes Philip
Rieff’s formulation “the triumph of the therapeutic” to capture the
worldview embedded in the happiness industry whereby “all
overarching structures of meaning have collapsed, and there is
nothing at stake beyond a manipulatable sense of well-being.”
Nonetheless, the therapeutic culture taps into the modern
democratic sensibility that valorizes individual autonomy and agency
as well as universal parity, hence proving irresistible to emancipatory
causes, most notably feminism.
Because the social order is experienced as having no inherent
basis for continuity, it must be continuously reinvented and
reaffirmed from within multitudes of individuals. As Potter (1988)
points out, “If emotions must be expressed sincerely, and the lack of
sincere feeling invalidates relationship, then the individual is
required to produce a continuous stream of emotional expression
that is simultaneously sincere and appropriate; if this does not occur,
the social order is endangered” (183). The happiness imperative
works especially to the advantage of capital by imposing an on-going
regime of self-monitoring and self-improvement (Davies 2015). To
cope with this burden, Americans turn to psychoanalysis,
psychotherapy, and self-help advice, all instruments of biopower
that prey on their happiness anxiety. In her latest book Why Love
Hurts, Eva Illouz (2012) argues that psychoanalysis is to love what
neoliberalism is to society: whenever things go wrong, it is your own
fault. In medieval Europe, love sickness was borne with dignity and
pride as a token of one’s strength of character: “The aristocratic
aestheticization of suffering combined with religious transfiguration
to render it an order of experience that lent meaning and even
greatness to the self” (129). Today, in contrast, it is a pathological
condition that must be cured for the sake of happiness. The spread of
positive psychology makes it practically inconceivable to include
pain and suffering in the definition of the good life (Ehrenreich
2009).
While Americans seem as adept at critiquing, even mocking
their obsession with happiness as they are at pursuing it, Illouz (an
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Israeli sociologist) is among the few who take due notice of
happyism’s umbilical cord to democracy, that is, its roots in the
emergence of the middle class and the sanctification of ordinary life,
the humanitarian intolerance of suffering on the part of disadvantaged
groups (slaves, women, ethnic minorities, animals), and the aporia of
the liberal democratic polity in which an elite minority governs a
heterogeneous majority notwithstanding the noble idea of popular
sovereignty. It is not far-fetched to say that happyism and its manifold
maladies are the price of democracy and the seeds were sown at the
inception of the great American experiment.
Although the paradox of happiness is most acutely experienced
in contemporary America, the challenge of grounding a social order
in individual emotion was also keenly felt by the May Fourth and
post-May Fourth generations who boldly broke with the patriarchal
kinship system and insisted on injecting freedom, autonomy, and
equality into the institutions of marriage and family. In Su Qing’s
autobiographical novel introduced at the beginning, the narrator
endured ten years of loveless marriage and finally found the courage
to seek a divorce. In the sequel, she chronicles her life as a professional
writer and magazinist during and after Shanghai’s “lonely island”
period (1937-45) in the midst of Japanese occupation of eastern
China. After a rocky start, she managed to launch a moderately
successful career, acquiring a sizeable readership, enjoying the
friendship and patronage of Shanghai’s elite circle of literati and
politicians, and moving freely in the city and beyond insofar as it was
possible to do so under Japanese blockade. Although she was unable
to shake off a nagging sense of failure and loneliness as a divorcee, she
looked upon her decade of married life with regret and horror.
Early in the novel, she documents in excruciating detail her first
pregnancy. Her in-laws, confidently anticipating a man-child,
practically hoisted her on a pedestal and forced upon her a regimen
of excessively rich foods and zero mobility. The moment her daughter
was born, however, she was all but forgotten with only shame to keep
her company. The experience permitted her no illusion about having
any intrinsic worth (renge) as a person. Her sporadic efforts to start a
career in teaching and writing were thwarted by the in-laws and the
husband, who told her in no uncertain terms that her sole raison
d'être was to produce the family’s heir. Her status deteriorated
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further with each successive birth of a daughter. After the couple
relocated to Shanghai so that the husband could continue his study
and pursue a career in law, he took to philandering and refused to
discharge his duty to provide for the family. Day in and day out the
narrator had to scheme to wring a measly sum out of him for the
daily provisions. At one point, no longer able to bear the strain of
uncertainty and constant threat of hunger, she implored him for a
fixed monthly allowance for household expenditures: “we can’t go
on like this: a few dimes when you’re in a good mood and nary a
penny when you’re in a foul mood.” He retorted: “I myself don’t
have any fixed income. Where do you get off demanding a fixed
allowance? You’re on your own. I don’t eat at home anyhow. …
Frankly, if you’re gonna ask for money, you might as well put on a
pleasant face. But you go about it as if I’ve owed you something since
the previous life. If I were to give the money to the taxi dancers,
they’d be kissing my feet in gratitude!” (171).
The reference to taxi dancers highlighted, in a viciously stinging
way, the lack of renge on the part of the domestic woman. If dignity
and autonomy could not be accommodated by marriage, then
marriage could no longer be the institutional framework for the
pursuit of happiness. The divorce was thus precipitated as much by
the husband’s infidelity as by his contempt for her. It marked a
turning point both exhilarating and frightening. Although her dozen
or so (married) male friends and associates were solicitous and
occasionally flirtatious with her, she was cognizant of her diminishing
prospect of remarriage. At the same time she was far more assured of
her self-worth than ever. The fact that she had given birth to three
daughters receded into the background as she came to be identified
with her writings and addressed respectfully by her readers as “Su
Xiansheng” 蘇先生or Maestro Su. A close friend even reported to
her a quarrel between himself and his wife at home. Allegedly, upon
hearing him speak of the narrator’s plight as a single woman, the wife
protested: “So you pity Miss Su. Why don’t you have some sympathy
for your own wife too? She may have lost her husband’s love, but she
must be very happy [xingfu], having the lot of you to comfort her. As
for me…” (305). To be sure, happiness for the narrator admitted a
large dose of pain (especially that of losing custody of her children),
yet she clearly preferred to live by the modern creed that social
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relationships and institutions must be grounded in emotional
authenticity. A marriage without love or mutual respect was not
worth saving for the sake of the traditional aspirations for fu-lu-shou.
That she took to recording her triumphs and tribulations betrayed a
desire to affirm, and to win affirmation from her readers, her fateful
decision to seek happiness outside its conventional locus.
In the volatile condition of occupied Shanghai, the narrator
found herself perennially buffeted by financial insecurity until she
gained the attention of a VIP in Wang Jingwei’s 汪精衛 puppet
regime (likely Chen Gongbo 陳公博, mayor of Shanghai, 1940-45)
whom she met at a party and who at a later point anonymously
presented her with a check. It was a sum large enough to take money
worries entirely off her mind for several years. The gift’s moral taint
haunted her, yet in her straitened circumstances she could not afford
to turn it away—at this point she was also providing child support as
her ex-husband’s finances had hit bottom. Surviving as a professional
single woman in a troubled time meant that she had to go on making
compromising choices like this. The life course she had charted for
herself was thus not only rife with loneliness and insecurity but was
also a morally and politically compromised affair in her own eyes and
a fortiori in the eyes of her detractors who considered her a literary
harlot 文妓 selling moral integrity for bourgeois comforts and vanity.
But she drew a line between herself and bona-fide collaborators 漢
奸:
Yes, I made a living with my writings in occupied
Shanghai. But the “good” timing was a mere
coincidence, not that I deliberately chose to take up
scribbling during those “auspicious” years. It’s true
that I didn’t chant “Down with the imperialists!”
That’s because I was afraid of being dragged into the
military police station to be tortured. Even if it
wasn’t dangerous, I’m not one given to sloganeering
anyway. I think the question is not whether I sold
my writings, but whether my writings jeopardized
the Republic. Consider this: rice merchants also sold
rice and rickshaw pullers also pulled any and all
kinds of customers [in occupied Shanghai; yet no
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one is going after them]. So long as our country does
not deny that those of us residing in occupied
territories still had a right to life, however feeble and
cowardly it was, then I admit that I did scratch out
such a living. But I do not feel terribly guilty about
it. (193)
In the end, Su Qing paid dearly for this streak of independence.
After the war she was picked up by KMT police for questioning and
her name was subject to a smear campaign. After 1949, she suffered
even more denunciations and persecutions and eventually died an
obscure death. She never wrote fiction and never married again. For
the nationalists and revolutionaries, however, the snuffing out of one
woman’s hope for happiness was negligible compared with the epic
life and death struggle of the Chinese nation throughout the first
half of the 20th century. In times of national crisis and national
regeneration, those who blithely buried their heads in the shallow
sands of domestic life, profit-seeking, and career advancement—the
central ingredients of ordinary life sanctified in the Enlightenment—
had fallen victim to “bourgeois decadence.” This line of argument
was espoused fervently by leftist intellectuals and later by the Chinese
Communist Party. Ding Ling’s 丁玲 “Shanghai, Spring 1930” 1930
年春上海 gives us two such myopic characters, one male and one
female, who are unable to see beyond tawdry private pleasures and
career success—unlike their respective spouses who find meaning
and purpose in underground revolutionary activism. Happiness for
the latter is defined in collective, political terms requiring the
curtailment or sacrifice of almost all that constitutes the satisfaction
and fulfillment of an ordinary life—for the ultimate goal of restoring
vernacular happiness to the “people” in the indefinite future.
Consumers and Dreamers (and the State)
It seems that we have come full circle to the Confucian
bifurcated conception of happiness whereby the ruling class assumed
the obligation to facilitate the realization of the plebeian desire for
human flourishing. The difference is that the Confucian elites
patronized the vernacular cult of fu and to some extent also partook
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of its basic values and aspirations. Communist orthodoxy, however,
grew increasingly hostile toward the quotidian conception of
happiness and its ritual and religious trappings. Vernacular happiness
came to be regarded as suspect and illegitimate. In its place was
enshrined the socialist ethic of service and self-sacrifice. A new kind
of asceticism reigned supreme in the revolutionary ranks who were
urged to serve the people 為人民服務 and create happiness for the
people 為人民謀幸福. Any pain, deprivation, and suffering in the
present was justified as necessary sacrifice for the collective future,
now that happiness was once again de-individualized and its proper
subject further projected onto the socialist fatherland. Before such a
sublime entity, any romantic heartache, domestic discord, social
mishap, career frustration, not to mention ennui, appeared hopelessly
trite. Vernacular happiness was now synonymous with selfishness
and its pursuit could amount to a political crime.4
Before the Communist rejection of bourgeois decadence and
reintroduction of a ritual-political order was taken to the extreme
during the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), the call for subordinating
4

Jiwei Ci 慈繼偉 (1994) uses “utopianism” to characterize both the
Communist revolution that founded the People’s Republic in 1949 and
the three decades of socialist experiment that ensued. In his view, the
entire radical Marxist project was in essence an unprecedented voluntarist
pursuit of future happiness, hence its tremendous appeal to China’s
suffering multitudes. This hedonic strand, initially submerged under
revolutionary asceticism, reared its head when the radical project
collapsed and nihilism set in at the end of the 1970s and then blossomed
in all its crassness and excess in the new millennium. Hedonism thus
constitutes a through line of China’s revolutionary century. The 1989
pro-democracy movement was but a last gasp of utopianism that
momentarily sublimated its shadowy twin hedonism in the form of
political liberalism—the outcry against official corruption boiled down
to resentment against “the goods of hedonism unfairly enjoyed by some
and denied to other” (8). To me, this account verges on the absurd in its
reductiveness. In putting the complex tapestry of 20th-century Chinese
history through the wringer of a monochromatic utilitarian philosophy
according to which all human endeavors aim merely for the satisfaction of
“sensuous needs” (12-13), the author is willfully blind to the all-consuming
quests for national sovereignty, social justice, liberty, and individual rights
and dignity (renge).
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the smaller self 小我 to the greater self 大我 and prioritizing national
salvation over individual happiness seemed not only reasonable but
positively welcomed by the post-May Fourth generation dealing
with the fallout of the romantic experiment. The urgency of saving
China from imperialist conquest was such that no personal sacrifice
was too great. As a popular slogan put it rhetorically: “Where is home
when the nation is no more?” 沒有國哪有家. And yet not everyone
subscribed to this nationalist logic. Su Qing’s fellow Shanghai writer
Zhang Ailing 張愛玲 published a novella called “Love in a Fallen
City” 傾城之戀 (2006) in the 1940s about a young divorcee seeking
in vain the security and contentment of home and hearth until the
fall of Hong Kong makes it all possible for her. Reared in an
aristocratic family, the heroine fears the stigma of déclassé attached
to working women and deems a respectable remarriage her only
lifeline. At her natal home where she has sought temporary refuge,
she is endlessly needled with reminders of her not belonging there.
At the news of her ex-husband’s untimely death, she is urged to
return thither and assume the position of the chaste widow, which
could restore her claim to financial support and old age care. Instead,
she bravely throws herself into the game of love played by the dandies
and flappers of Shanghai and Hong Kong. Yet just like Su Qing’s
narrator who realizes with rueful resentment that an impecunious
30-ish divorcee, however charming, has little to recommend herself
on the marriage market, Zhang’s vivacious and beautiful heroine
dallies with a wealthy overseas Chinese playboy with little hope of
getting him to tie the knot with her—until the romantic merry-goround is put paid to by a tempest of bullets and artillery shells from
the invading Japanese army. With no more dance balls and soirees to
attend and so many daily chores and worries to occupy them, the pair
settle down to domestic life and begin to live in earnest as husband
and wife who are thankful to have each other. The heroine gets a
taste of happiness for the first time in many years, no matter that
thousands have perished in the battle that has brought down the
city.
Zhang’s contrarian tale has troubled and fascinated countless
readers and critics. It seems unconscionable that a woman should
rejoice over her personal triumph amid death and destruction. Yet
few other stories ever talk so audaciously back to the nationalist
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diktat about the conjoined fate of home and nation: For a woman
who is already rendered homeless by the patriarchal kinship system,
the death of the nation 亡國 amounts to a wild card that could make
her situation worse, or, in an ironic twist of fate, make her dream
come true. Vernacular happiness could be made synchronous with
the fate of the nation only if there were no hierarchies of gender and
class and no conflict of interests and values, that is, if there was no
human plurality. Zhang’s story makes it plain that even between a
man and a woman in love, divergence in interests and goals can give
rise to endless skirmishes. Who is to say which side has a greater
claim to his or her vision of happiness? And when it comes to
demanding sacrifice for the good of the nation, who is to say that the
common good does not in fact serve only a privileged few? Who can
know for certain that the greater good is worth all the unhappiness
endured in its name and that it will ultimately redound to the benefit
of all, equally and fairly?
These were precisely the questions posed by the post-Mao
generation reeling from the colossal sacrifices demanded of them by
the party-state for the sake of a communist utopia. It came as a
terrible revelation that the party did not know best, and that the
abnegation of the smaller self had not brought in return a strong
nation and a flourishing society. Bidding farewell to revolution, the
Chinese embarked on the pursuit of vernacular happiness with a
vengeance. In pointed defiance of the socialist service ethic, happiness
was recast in personal, private, even unabashedly materialist terms:
the joy of romantic love, pleasure of sensuality, satisfaction of a wellpaid job, admiration of peers, reward of good health, gratification of
a cohesive family, security of owning one’s home, delights in art and
entertainment, and thrills of a consumer lifestyle with its endless
choices and possibilities. To be sure, conflict and disappointment
invariably arose, but few were willing to return to the collectivist era
when the state promised to remove such petty troubles by imposing
a unified, transcendent vision of the good life.
In the three decades of reform and opening up, the state has
retreated from private life and renounced campaign-style politics. It
has not only acquiesced to the post-Mao resurgence of vernacular
happiness but is also actively fostering it through the deepening of
market reforms and sponsorship of a consumerist economy that
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delivers bread and circuses to the masses long starved for such humble
pleasures. It even permits a degree of religious freedom, opening the
space for the worship of ancestors, gods, and spirits and allowing
people to frame their disparate visions of the good life in kinship
and/or spiritual terms. But, above all, it is the Enlightenmentinspired, renge-based, and subjective understanding of happiness
that has made a triumphant comeback. In a kind of replay of the May
Fourth discovery of the individual and celebration of free love and
free marriage, the post-Mao discourse of happiness unfolds almost
entirely in the context of reclaiming love, marriage, and family as the
bedrock of human rights. With life’s meaning and purpose once
again vested in the affairs of the heart, small wonder that by far the
most numerous and most popular narratives, in both verbal and
visual media, are dedicated to intimate, emotionally charged
relationships between lovers, spouses, and parents and children.
Although lexicographic and syntactic inertia has carried the
connotation of good fortune into the contemporary usage of
xingfu—as when the Chinese title of Will Smith’s 2006 film The
Pursuit of Happyness becomes When Happiness Comes Knocking 當
幸福來敲門, China’s swelling ranks of the middle class have
decidedly swapped fu-lu-shou for the American Dream and
regarded the pursuit of happiness as a birthright and self-directed
project and turned more readily to self-help guides and happiness
gurus than to the gods or the government (Madsen 1995, Yang
2014, Zhang 2014a).
Once happiness becomes an emotion, or “an ideal of
uninterrupted good feelings” (McMahon 2006, 462), contemporary
urban Chinese have also come to experience the same quandary that
attends happyism. Noting the astonishing success of the “smiley
face” worldwide and the imperative of constant good cheer,
McMahon (2006) writes: “Who among us never smiles for the
camera? A glance at the family photo album will confirm that our
grandparents’ generation was seldom so quick to present itself in this
light. And when we think that the smile of Mona Lisa, just five
centuries old, was something of an anomaly and a shock in its time,
we get an idea of how much we—how much the world—has changed”
(464). Much of urban China can be included in the global “we” here.
Taking stock of the exponential growth of the happiness industrial-
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academic-entertainment complex, Jackson Lears (2013) notes that
“behind the facade of smiley-faced optimism, American culture
seems awash in a pervasive sadness, or at least a restless longing for a
sense of fulfillment that remains just out of reach.” In China too, just
as vernacular happiness is granted relative free rein, depressive
disorders are also on the rise, giving impetus to a regime of therapeutic
governance with a global psychiatric industry peddling psychotropic
drugs on its heels (Kleinman 2011, Yang 2014, Zhang 2014b)—a
trend lamented by Ethan Watters (2010) in his ethnographical study
of “the Americanization of mental illness” that privileges psychopharmaceutical treatment in place of communal coping mechanisms.
Urban China seems light years from the rural society that
Potter set foot on some 30 years ago where she was flummoxed by the
inattention to emotion and reluctance to make much of it. Today
emotion talk is positively deafening. Even in the absence of electoral
politics, the social order is increasingly grounded in feelings—the
elusive but incontestable nerve centers of vernacular happiness,
increasingly manifested as “a deep and vulnerable desire…to be
healed of the dissatisfactions of being human” (McMahon 2006,
471). Although the state has not gone so far as to infuse a special
“high”-inducing chemical in the drinking water to pacify the
population as the Hong Kong author Chan Koon-chung 陳冠中
(2011) fantasizes in his post-apocalyptic novel The Fat Years 盛世─
中國2013, it has not shied away from playing the politics of
happiness.5 Surveying the People’s Daily and China Daily, the official
mouthpieces of the party, Anna Sun (2014) notes the sharp rise in
the frequency with which “happiness” has appeared in article titles
since 2000. She connects it to the reorientation of the national
agenda from the relentless class struggle and developmentalism of
5

Predictably, the paternalistic discourse of happiness has spawned much
cynical mimicry and spoof. The renowned poet Bei Dao 北島 may have
been the first practitioner of this genre when he entitled his claustrophobic
short story about a totalitarian world “No. 13 Happiness Street” 幸福大
街13號 (1985). Other examples include The Happy Life of Chatterbox
Zhang Damin 貧嘴張大民的幸福生活 (a novel by Liu Heng 劉恆,
adapted for the big screen by Yang Yazhou 楊亞洲 in 1998 and the small
screen in 2000 by Shen Haofang 沈好放), and the cheeky substitution of
the character for sex 性 for the character for fortune 幸 in xingfu.
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the Mao era to the goal of “modest prosperity” 小康, a term that
resonates well with both the Confucian tradition of benevolent
governance 仁政 and the folk cult of happiness. In a similar vein,
Yanhua Zhang (2014b) approaches the “Yu Dan 于丹
phenomenon”—referring to a college professor’s phenomenal
success with a televised lecture series that packaged the Analects as a
bible for “the happiness of the heart”—in light of the state’s effort to
steer the national conversation in a neoliberal direction through its
sponsorship of happiness-themed mass media programs and scholarly
research projects, including the annual happiness survey published
in the journal aptly named Modest Prosperity 小康.
More recently, as an antidote to the global spread of the
American Dream whose rabid individualist ethos has been blamed
for many contemporary social ills, most notably economic inequality
and social anomie, the state has proposed the “China Dream” 中國
夢. Individual Chinese are urged to dream, to desire, and to strive in
their personal, idiosyncratic ways (within certain bounds, of course),
but they are also to think of their dreams as somehow connected to
something larger than atomistic selves and therefore more worthy
and enduring (Denton 2014). That larger something is invariably the
nation, specifically a rising China and the glory of being a citizen of a
rich and powerful country commanding the respect and even
deference of the rest of the world—precisely the kind of overarching
framework of moral purpose that has been lost in America according
to the authors of Habits of the Heart (Bellah et al. 1986, see also
Madsen et al. 2001). Perhaps out of the recognition that happiness
without the freedom of choice or happiness in the absence of justice
is a false good (Zhou 2012), the state now pursues an indulgent,
neoliberalized version of Huang Liuhong’s Confucian paternalism.
Instead of prohibiting vernacular happiness for its anarchic or
anomic tendencies, or requiring everyone to dream the same lofty
dream, the state now merely nudges everyone toward something
beyond themselves and their good feelings, if only to save them from
their “glorious, but terrifying, isolation” (Bellah et al. 1986, 6). For
those panting on the “hedonic treadmill,” a condition long familiar
to the citizens of the affluent West where happiness has not grown
proportionately with rising incomes after a certain threshold, this
could even be a welcome reprieve.

Summer 2017 | 119

The China Dream is what Lydia Liu 劉禾 (2004) would call a
“supersign,” born of the heterolinguistic, cross-cultural marriage
between the century-old Chinese quest for recognition and
preeminence in the global arena and the American Dream that still
holds hegemonic sway despite its fraying edge. In its amorphous
capaciousness, as William Callahan (2013) has documented recently,
the China Dream may well break through its nationalist confines, as
the American Dream has in the 20th century, and become amenable
to cosmopolitan appropriations for the sake of planetary goals like
combating climate change and implementing global justice. In that
light, the motto of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, “One World, One
Dream” 同一個世界同一個夢想, is both preposterous and audacious,
both an affront to the liberal sensibility and a challenge to a
dissentious world to dream a common future.
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